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Abstract 
We integrate multiple domains of psychological science to identify, better understand, and 
manage the effects of subtle but powerful biases in forensic mental health assessment.  This topic 
is ripe for discussion, as research evidence that challenges our objectivity and credibility garners 
increased attention both within and outside of psychology.  We begin by defining bias and 
provide rich examples from the judgment and decision making literature as they might apply to 
forensic assessment tasks.  The cognitive biases we review can help us explain common 
problems in interpretation and judgment that confront forensic examiners. This leads us to ask 
(and attempt to answer) how we might use what we know about bias in forensic clinicians’ 
judgment to reduce its negative effects.   
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The Cognitive Underpinnings of Bias in Forensic Mental Health Evaluations 
 
Mr. Jones, a 24-year-old man facing a felony charge of cocaine trafficking, had been convicted of 
four previous offenses (assault & battery, theft, trespassing, and giving a false name to a police 
officer). He had never before received psychiatric treatment, but his attorney requested an 
evaluation of his client’s mental status at the time of his alleged offense.  Converging evidence 
indicated (among other things) that Mr. Jones was influenced by his antisocial peers, his substance 
abuse was impacting his relationships at the time of the crime, and he had a history of several 
head injuries resulting in loss of consciousness.  After hearing the case, the court found Mr. Jones 
Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGI).   
 
Now please rank the following six categories of mental illness in order of the likelihood that, at the 
time of the offense, Mr. Jones met diagnostic criteria for each.  Use 1 for most and 6 for least likely. 
__Affective Disorder    __Personality Disorder 
__Mental Retardation / Intellectual Disability   __Substance Use Disorder 
__Psychotic Disorder    __Dissociative Disorder 
 
 The question in this vignette is straightforward for readers who know the relative 
likelihood of various mental disorders in defendants found NGI.  Defendants with psychotic 
disorders are the most likely to be found NGI, and defendants with personality disorders are 
among the least likely to be found NGI (Cochrane, Grisso, & Frederick, 2001; Warren, Murrie, 
Chauhan, Dietz, & Morris, 2004).  Given the fact that Mr. Jones was found NGI, the “base rates” 
of the various disorders in the NGI population should have weighed heavily in the decision task.  
However, we provided stereotypic information about Mr. Jones that did not fit with the NGI 
research data.  In fact, we intentionally designed Mr. Jones as an “anti base-rate character” (see 
Kahneman, 2011) to illustrate one kind of cognitive bias, the representativeness heuristic, which 
we discuss below in more depth along with other kinds of biases.   
The purpose of this review is to apply information from multiple domains of 
psychological science (e.g., cognitive, social, methological, clinical) to identify and better 
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understand bias in forensic mental health assessment.  This topic is ripe for discussion as several 
studies have investigated potential bias in the work of forensic experts.  For example, Murrie, 
Boccaccini, and colleagues published compelling data documenting the “allegiance effect” in 
forensic assessments (see e.g., Murrie, Boccaccini, Guarnera, & Rufino, 2013).  Their data suggest 
that adversarially-retained experts tend to interpret data and score certain psychological 
assessment instruments in ways that are more likely to support the retaining party’s position.  
We begin by defining bias.  Then we review evidence for bias in forensic mental health 
practice in the context of rich research and theory on judgment and decision making.  Along the 
way, we offer examples of how various theories of bias can help us explain common problems in 
interpretation and judgment that confront forensic examiners.  This leads us to ask how we can 
use what we know about bias in clinicians’ judgment to find ways to reduce it.  We describe 
various approaches to the problem and offer ideas that may stimulate research on interventions to 
mitigate the negative effects of bias in forensic evaluators’ decision making processes.  
Defining “Bias” 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2012), the word “bias” was first 
documented in the mid-16th century.  It has roots in the French biais, which is perhaps based on 
the Greek epikarsios, for “oblique.”  Bias was originally used to describe both a slanting line 
(i.e., the diagonal in a square) and a curve, such as the shape given to the side of a bowl or the 
curve of a cheek, as used by Shakespeare, “Thy sphered Bias cheeke” (1609, Troilus & Cressida 
IV, vi.8).  It also was used to refer to the oblique motion of a loaded bowling ball (as well as to 
the asymmetric construction of the bowling ball by loading one side with lead), exemplified by 
Shakespeare’s passage: “Well, forward, forward thus the bowle should run.  And not unluckily 
against the bias” (1596, The Taming of the Shrew IV, v. 25, as cited by Keren & Tiegen, 2004).  
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The word was also used in the fabric industry to refer to cutting diagonally across the grain, “cut 
along the bias,” and in cooking as well; for instance, slicing carrot at a sharp angle increases the 
surface area of each slice and is thought to be visually appealing for food presentation. 
These two uses of the term “bias” capture different meanings.  It can be used to describe 
deviations from the norm (as with motion of the loaded bowling ball) or slanting one way rather 
than another (like the diagonal line).  Error in judgment is not necessarily indicated, although the 
term as used today often carries a negative connotation.  Keren and Tiegen (2004) point out the 
distinction between bias being a cause vs. an effect, noting that the word is also used in both of 
these ways.  For example, the bias of the bowling ball can be in its shape or loading, causing it 
to curve (i.e., the cause), or it can refer to the trajectory of the ball (i.e., the effect).   
In the forensic mental health field, the word “bias” carries a negative connotation often 
associated with an inappropriate personal or emotional involvement on the part of the evaluator 
(Neal, 2011).  Bias may be outside the examiner’s awareness (i.e., implicit), but examiners may 
also be accused of purposefully putting a “spin” on the evaluation (i.e., explicit bias).  The 
insightful and purposeful “spin” may not be the biggest challenge facing forensic mental health 
professionals.  Evaluators who engage in explicit bias are likely to be recognized by their 
colleagues – in both the mental health and legal fields – as “hired guns” with reduced credibility 
as trustworthy experts.  Rather, the bigger challenge for the field (and for individual forensic 
practitioners) is likely in understanding and dealing with implicit bias in the way we process and 
interpret information and reach conclusions.  Although we acknowledge that explicit biases 
deserve attention, this review focuses primarily on the way in which examiners’ thinking and 
decision making may be systematically affected by implicit biases.  
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West and Kenny (2011) drew from multiple domains of psychology to create a single, 
integrative framework for the study of bias and accuracy.  It is called the “Truth and Bias (T&B) 
Model” of judgment.  Their T&B Model provides theoretical definitions and parameters of 
interest in the study of accuracy and bias.  It can be used to streamline science’s basic 
understanding of how these constructs operate independent of the researcher’s a priori field or 
theoretical reference point. The model they developed can be applied widely across 
psychological domains, including forensic psychology.  West and Kenny’s (2011) definition of 
bias, which we adopt in the present review, is any systematic factor (i.e., not random error) that 
determines judgment other than the truth.   
Given this definition of bias, what evidence do we have that it influences forensic 
practitioners in their work?  And how might we understand these influences on forensic 
practitioners? Fortunately, there is a rich body of judgment and decision making research that 
may provide the theoretical frameworks we need for explaining various cognitive biases that 
underlie human cognition.  These theoretical frameworks may help us bridge the gap to 
designing studies that could reduce bias in forensic decision making.  
Biases that May Affect Forensic Experts 
Forensic assessment tasks present a tall order.  Otto (2013) vividly outlined the difficulties 
faced by forensic clinicians (emphasis in original):  
To (in a limited amount of time, using assessment techniques of limited validity, and with 
a limited amount of information-some of which is provided by persons with an investment 
in the examiner forming a particular opinion) come to an accurate assessment about the 
past, current, and/or future emotional, behavioral, and/or cognitive functioning of an 
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examinee as it relates to some issue before the legal decision maker (while ensuring that 
how one has been involved in the case does not affect one’s decisions). 
Forensic evaluators are asked to gather comprehensive data with regard to the referral 
issue, to analyze the patterns and interrelationships among the various pieces of data (called 
“configural analysis”), and then interpret the data to reach an opinion that will assist the trier-of-
fact (see e.g., Faust & Faust, 2012). However, human brains do not have an endless capacity for 
processing information.  Simon (1956) called this constraint “bounded rationality:” we do the 
best we can within the design of our cognitive machinery.  As a consequence, people often use 
cognitive shortcuts or simplifying strategies to manage cognitive load.   
 There are two traditions of research with regard to human cognitive capacities 
(Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  The Heuristics and Biases (HB) tradition, which developed first, 
has focused on the limitations of and systematic errors in human cognition (see e.g., Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).  The Naturalistic 
Decision Making (NDM) tradition developed in part in reaction to HB’s narrow focus on 
problems in human cognition.  NDM has focused on the strengths and evolutionary adaptiveness 
of human cognitive capacities (see e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, 
& Salas, 2001).  For instance, NDM researchers argue our brains have adapted to process 
information in a fast and frugal way – quickly making sense of the vast amount of information 
with which we are constantly faced (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).   
Kahneman and Tversky, the founders of the HB tradition, showed humans’ decision-
making processes are much more prone to error than was previously imagined.  “Bias,” as used 
in the HB tradition, is a by-product of mental shortcuts called heuristics. Heuristics are decision 
aids that proceed along “rules of thumb,” used by people to arrive at efficient answers especially 
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when solutions are not readily apparent.  It shares the same root as the word eureka (Kahneman, 
2011).  The mechanisms underlying heuristics are incomplete, but they are adequate for most 
situations and usually assist people in arriving at valid answers while preserving mental 
resources (Keren & Tiegen, 2004).  Heuristics provide an adaptive pathway for humans to cope 
with limited processing capacities (i.e., an evolutionary strength according to NDM researchers), 
but the incomplete nature of heuristic methods means they can lead to error-proneness due to 
systematic biases under some circumstances (i.e., a limitation according to HB researchers).   
Heuristic “answers” can be thought of as approximations of the truth.  Theoretically, the 
truth could be discovered after an exhaustive step-by-step method of testing various possible 
solutions and arriving at the correct answer.  Einstein (1905), for example, called his first Nobel 
Prize-winning paper on quantum physics, “On a Heuristic Point of View toward the Emission 
and Transformation of Light.”  He used the term “heuristic” rather than “theory” to indicate that 
his new idea was an initial approximation should be further explored (Keren & Tiegen, 2004).   
There is a rich literature on various heuristics and biases that affect human thinking 
processes.  Since Kahneman and Tversky’s work in the 1970s, the number of “new” heuristics 
and biases has proliferated, although it is not always clear that the new discoveries are distinct 
from earlier-identified ones.  As such, we have organized this section by focusing on three major 
heuristics that were among those first discovered and discussed: representativeness, availability, 
and anchoring (Keren & Tiegen, 2004).  We provide examples of ways they might influence the 
judgment and decision making of forensic mental health examiners (see Table 1).1  Most of the 
research we review is from the judgment and decision making literature, and it may or may not 
                                                          
1 Heuristics are constructs used to describe cognitive processes by which we quickly summarize and make sense of 
data.  Ironically, the way we discuss these various heuristics actually function as heuristics themselves.  Also, our 
organization of these data is not the only way they can be organized.  Some of the heuristics we have subsumed 
under one of these three major heuristics could arguably fit equally well under one or more of the others.   
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translate to the tasks performed by forensic evaluators.  However, given that forensic evaluators 
are human, there are reasons to think these principles might apply.  One purpose of this review is 
to stimulate research on the biases as they may affect forensic clinicians. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Representativeness 
The representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974) is a mental shortcut in which the subjective probability of an event or sample is estimated 
based on its similarity to a class of events or a typical specimen.  If X looks like a typical 
representation of Y, it may easily be perceived as an example of Y, even if Y is improbable.  The 
vignette with which we began this paper provides an example.  Although a defendant found NGI 
is much more likely to have a psychotic disorder than a personality disorder, the limited 
information provided about Mr. Jones characterizes him as a more stereotypic representation of a 
man with Antisocial Personality Disorder than a man with a psychotic disorder.   
Think about this next example:  
John P. is a meek man, 42 years old, married with two children. His neighbors describe him as mild-
mannered but somewhat secretive. He owns an import-export company based in New York City, and he 
travels frequently to Europe and the Far East. Mr. P. was convicted once for smuggling precious stones and 
metals (including uranium) and received a suspended sentence of 6 months in jail and a large fine.  Mr. P. is 
currently under police investigation.  Please rank the following statements by the probabilities that they will 
be among the conclusions of the investigation.  Remember that other possibilities exist and that more than 
one statement may be true. Use 1 for the most probable statement, 2 for the second, etc. 
Mr. P. is a child molester. 
Mr. P. is involved in espionage and the sale of secret documents. 
Mr. P. is a drug addict. 
Mr. P. killed one of his employees. 
Mr. P. killed one of his employees to prevent him from talking to the police. 
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Does it seem like the last statement is more likely than the second-to-last statement?  If 
so, your brain has made an intuitive but incorrect judgment by disregarding a basic law of 
probability: the conjunction rule.  The probability of a conjunction, P(A&B) cannot exceed the 
probabilities of its elements, P(A) and P(B).   In this particular example, the addition of a 
possible motive in the last statement (“to prevent him from talking to the police”) reduces the 
probability of the last statement compared to the second-to-last statement (because Mr. P might 
have killed his employee for a variety of other reasons).  Therefore, if the A in this equation 
represents killing the employee to prevent him from talking to the police, and if B is all potential 
reasons for killing the employee, then A cannot equal more than A+B.  Kahneman and Tversky 
(1983), using this example, found that many people ranked the last statement as more likely than 
the second-to-last.  They termed this easy-to-make error the “conjunction fallacy.”  
  These findings are relevant to the work of forensic evaluators in many ways.  Suppose 
for instance that a 16-year old evaluee presents with symptoms of Attention Deficit-
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and Bipolar Disorder, a not uncommon occurrence because the 
diagnostic criteria overlap.  Given the conjunction rule, it is most likely the evaluee would not 
have both disorders even if it appears so.  The point here is that forensic evaluators should 
critically evaluate their decisions to diagnose both – the evaluee could indeed have both 
disorders and their life could be impaired incrementally by each disorder.  However, if the same 
pieces of data are being used to support both diagnoses (e.g., counting distractibility and 
excessive activity toward both), then perhaps the evaluator is in error by diagnosing both. 
As can be seen in these examples, the representativeness heuristic can easily lead to base 
rate neglect.  A base rate is the frequency with which a thing occurs.  Base rate neglect is a 
ubiquitous phenomenon that affects laypeople and professionals alike.  For example, Casscells, 
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Schoenberger, and Graboys (1978) asked Harvard Medical School faculty, staff, and fourth-year 
medical students the following question:  
If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive rate of 5%, what is the 
chance that a person found to have a positive result actually has the disease, assuming that you 
know nothing about the person’s symptoms or signs? _____% 
 
The correct Bayesian answer under the most plausible interpretation of the problem is 
about 2%.2  Specifically, 51 people out of 1000 would test positive (1 true positive and 50 false 
positives). Of the 51 people with positive tests, 1 would actually have the disease. Expressed as a 
proportion, this is 1/51 = 0.019 or 1.9%. But only 18% of the Harvard-affiliated participants had 
an answer close to 2%.  Forty-five percent of this distinguished group said the answer was 95%, 
thereby completely neglecting the base rate information.   
An internationally recognized forensic psychiatrist made this error in the John Hinckley 
trial. On cross examination, the defense expert witness testified that Mr. Hinckley’s brain had a 
particular brain anomaly in which his sulci were wider than normal, evidence the expert offered 
to support his conclusion that Mr. Hinckley had schizophrenia. On cross-examination: 
Q: Isn’t it true that the studies you are talking about indicate that most people who are 
schizophrenic don’t have widened sulci? 
A: To be precise about the word ‘most:’ In one study from St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, one-third of the 
schizophrenics had widened sulci.  That is a high figure.  It is true that the simple majority didn’t, 
                                                          
2 Bayesian analysis is a modern approach to statistics named after an 18th-century English reverend named Thomas 
Bayes.  He is credited with developing rules to explain how people should change their mind in light of evidence, as 
the evidence becomes available (Kahneman, 2011).  For example, suppose a colleague told you they just finished 
meeting with an attorney about a potential new referral. Not knowing anything else about they attorney, you should 
believe that the probability that the attorney was a woman is 33.3% (this is the base rate of women in the legal 
profession; American Bar Association [ABA], 2013).  Now suppose your colleague told you that s/he was impressed 
because the attorney was a managing partner at one of the largest law firms in the U.S. Taking into account this new 
information, where the base rate of women as managing partners in one of the 200 largest law firms in the U.S. is 
only 4% (ABA, 2013), then Bayes’ theorem says you should believe that the probability that the attorney was a 
woman is now 2.04%.  Although the equation is not listed out here, the example is included to demonstrate the 
importance of base rates in determining the probability of an occurrence.  
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but the fact that one-third had these widened sulci—whereas in normals, probably less than one 
out of fifty have them—that is a powerful fact. 
Q: That is a fact? 
A: Yes…It is a statistical fact, as I mentioned, that one-third of schizophrenics have widened sulci 
and probably less than two per cent of the normal people have them.  That is a powerful statistical 
fact and it would bear on the opinion in this case (Caplan, 1984, as cited by Linder, n.d.). 
 
We can use Bayesian reasoning to calculate the likelihood of having schizophrenia, given 
the presence of the brain anomaly. The base rate of schizophrenia in the general population is 
approximately 0.5% (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Given the base rate, 50 out of 
every 10,000 people would have schizophrenia. According to the expert, of those 50 people with 
schizophrenia, one-third, or approximately 17 people, would have widened sulci. Of the 10,000 
people, 9,950 would not have schizophrenia. Of the 9,950 people without schizophrenia, 1 out of 
50, or 199 people, would have widened sulci. Thus, the number of people with widened sulci 
would be 216 (17 + 199). Of the 216 people with widened sulci, 17 would have schizophrenia. 
Expressed in a proportion, 17 / 216 = 0.078 or 7.8% of people with widened sulci would have 
schizophrenia. Thus, we can see that the expert’s conclusion about the evidence being 
“powerful” did not appear to account for the low base rate of schizophrenia in the population.  
An example more typical of routine forensic practice may involve the assessment of 
future violence or recidivism risk, both of which have relatively low base rates in some forensic 
populations (e.g., roughly 10%; Campbell & DeClue, 2010; Monahan et al., 2005).  The lower 
the base rate, the more challenging the assessment becomes, because even when evaluators use 
evidence-based tools, the tools are limited by the base rates.  Campbell and DeClue (2010), for 
example, demonstrated what would happen if an evaluator used a very good sexual offense 
recidivism assessment tool (the Static-99; Hanson & Thornton, 1999) to estimate relative 
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likelihood of future violence of 100 different evaluees.  If the base rate was 19% (this is the base 
rate used in the example by Campbell and DeClue), and if the evaluator “bet the base rates” and 
predicted that all of these 100 people would be at very low risk to sexually re-offend within a 10 
year period, the evaluator would be correct about 81% of the time.  They asked whether 
employing the Static-99 could improve the accuracy of the assessment.  They demonstrated that 
the overall accuracy to classify risk when using the measure would be about 76%, a decrease in 
overall accuracy compared to relying on the base rate alone.  The lower the base rate (e.g., if it is 
10% rather than 19%), the worse the predictions will be, compared to “betting the base rates.”  
In clinical contexts, experts often underutilize or ignore base rate information and tend to 
rely instead on case-specific information (Carroll, 1977; Faust & Faust, 2012; Nickerson, 2004).  
The problem with this practice is that salient but less predictive case-specific information can 
draw the clinician’s attention away from the relevant base rates and have the adverse effect of 
decreasing accuracy (see e.g., Faust & Faust, 2012).  Base rates are critical and should be part of 
a forensic evaluator’s thinking processes whenever possible.   
Availability 
The availability heuristic refers to the ease with which one can recall other examples of 
the event in question, which increases the likelihood of an interpretation (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973, 1974).  In an early description of this heuristic, the philosopher David Hume (1976 [1736]) 
described the human tendency to judge an event’s probability by how “fresh” it is in memory.  
Other factors that increase availability are frequency and salience.  For example, consider the 
task forensic clinicians are asked to conduct in violence or sexual offending risk assessments.  A 
false negative occurs when a person is assessed as unlikely to reoffend but does in fact reoffend.  
Imagine a high-profile re-offense ending up in the newspaper, the evaluator being asked by the 
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local news media, “How could you have missed this,” and the evaluator’s employer undertaking 
a performance review of his or her work as a result.  False negatives are likely to be much more 
memorable than a false positive (i.e., assessed as likely to reoffend but does not).  The perceived 
likelihood of future reoffending might be overestimated due to the availability of information 
about instances in which a clinician was incorrect and the salience of anticipated regret. 
Before reading further, please complete this exercise. 
There is a set of cards. On Side 1 is a letter and on Side 2 is a number. The following hypothesis is 
proposed:  “Whenever there is an A on Side 1, there is a 2 on Side 2.”  Please look at these 4 
cards, two with Side 1 exposed and two with Side 2 exposed: 
 
 
The question is: How many cards, and which ones, could you turn over to effectively test the hypothesis? 
 
If you make an error, you’ll be in good company.  Most people (even trained scientists 
and professionals like both of the authors of this paper) have trouble correctly answering this 
question.  The answer is 2.  Two cards can effectively test the hypothesis: the “A” and “1” cards.  
Finding a “1” on the back of the “A” would allow you to reject the hypothesis, as would finding 
an “A” on the back of the “1” card.  No other possibilities would reject the hypothesis (task 
adapted from Wason, 1968). Turning over “B” will not do it because it is not relevant to the 
hypothesis – no matter what is on the other side, it will not be helpful for testing the hypothesis. 
Turning over the “2” will not allow you to reject the hypothesis either; seeing an “A” on the 
reverse side would only confirm the hypothesis, and seeing a “B” would not tell you anything 
about the hypothesis.  If you thought the “2” should be turned over, you engaged in a cognitive 
error called the positive test strategy (Kayman & Ha, 1987).  Positive test strategy is a mental 
heuristic whereby hypotheses are tested exclusively (or primarily) by searching for evidence that 
has the best chance of verifying current beliefs, rather than those that have the best chance of 
2 1 B A 
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falsifying them. And the evidence suggests that this kind of bias is pervasive, even in the absence 
of any particular outcome motivations (Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983; MacCoun, 1998).  
How is this example of positive test strategy relevant to forensic practice?  It 
demonstrates the confirmation bias, which may plague forensic clinicians. Confirmation bias is a 
set of tendencies to seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, 
expectations, or hypotheses (Nickerson, 1998).  Turning over cards to confirm the hypothesis is 
not an effective method of testing the hypothesis because ruling out the possibility that 
something is false is a step toward demonstrating its truth.3  The ubiquity of this error has 
important implications for forensic evaluators.  Mackay’s compelling line demonstrates this bias 
well (1932 [1852], p. 552), “When men wish to construct or support a theory, how they torture 
facts into their service!” (Women, too.) 
Clinicians may make conclusions based on inadequately formed hypotheses, they may 
not gather the necessary data needed to adequately test their hypotheses, and they may seek and 
rely mainly or exclusively on information that confirms their “hunch.”  Imagine that you have 
returned from vacation to find a new evaluation assignment in your box that is due in just a few 
days.  In this case, you might be more likely to generate a “hunch” quickly (maybe within the 
first few minutes of meeting with the evaluee), then look for information that would confirm 
your intuition.  Doing so means you can finish your evaluation and report quickly.  Even in less 
time-sensitive circumstances, evaluators may engage in these behaviors because doing so means 
the work gets done more quickly and it is less effort-intensive than methodically testing 
alternative hypotheses and seeking information that might disprove one’s intuition. 
                                                          
3 This principle is rooted in Karl Popper’s (1959) principle of falsificationism.  Popper argued that whereas 
induction could never confirm a hypothesis, induction might permit one to falsify it (e.g., “If p then q; not q; 
therefore, not p”) (MacCoun, 1998).  Popper contended that falsification permits us to weed out bad ideas while 
seeing how our leading hypotheses hold up under attack (MacCoun, 1998).     
BIAS IN FORENSIC EVALUATIONS  17 
 
An evaluator’s initial hypothesis or “hunch” might be made based on the evaluator’s own 
personal and political beliefs, exposure to pretrial publicity (e.g., suggestibility and expectancy), 
or comments from the referral party regarding their hypotheses about the defendant’s mental 
health.  For instance, imagine a defense attorney calls to tell you about a case and see if you are 
interested in the referral.  The attorney  says, “I have this really mentally ill guy who is being 
railroaded by the system” as compared to a prosecutor who calls about the same case and says, 
“This guy is faking – there’s no way he’s sick.  We need your help to prove it.”  Other examples 
involve information arising from the institutional environment.  For example, imagine 
conducting an annual evaluation for an NGI acquittee to help the court determine whether s/he 
continues to meet commitment criteria. If you work in this institution, you might have repeatedly 
heard about how “crazy” or “dangerous” the patient is from numerous co-workers, which might 
influence the way you perceive the evaluee and the conclusions you reach. All of these sources 
of opinion can have subtle effects that set up the potential for confirmation bias.   
Confirmation bias may also occur due to sharing a preliminary opinion before the 
evaluation is complete. For instance, forensic mental health clinicians might be asked to answer 
questions about the way they are “leaning” in a case based on their initial interpretation of 
partially-collected data (by retaining parties, supervisors, colleagues). Answering such questions 
prematurely commits the examiner in a way that makes it more difficult to resist confirmation 
bias when completing the final interpretation of one’s data.  
Confirmation bias may range on a continuum from unmotivated on the examiner’s part 
(see e.g., Faust & Faust, 2012) to motivated (see e.g., Festinger, 1957; Kunda, 1990).  Motivated 
reasoning may allow an evaluator to arrive at a particular desired conclusion, constrained only by 
the evaluator’s ability to construct reasonable justifications for their conclusion (Kunda, 1990).  
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In a recent study, Mannes and Moore (2013) demonstrated that people tended to do a poor job of 
adequately adjusting their initial estimates after subsequently receiving relevant new information 
or information about the consequences of being wrong. They concluded that people, driven by 
their subjective confidence, tend to have unwarranted and excessive faith in the accuracy of their 
own judgments.  Dana, Dawes, and Peterson (2013) showed that interviewers who used 
unstructured interviews were able to “make sense” out of virtually anything the interviewee said 
(even when the responses were nonsense because the interviewee answered questions using a 
random response system).  The interviewers formed interview impressions just as confidently 
after getting random responses as they did when they got real responses. 
WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is) is a heuristic concept describing an apparent 
design feature of the human brain: only activated ideas are processed within a given cognitive 
task or decision making procedure (Kahneman, 2011).  Information that is not retrieved while a 
person analyzes or interprets information might as well not exist.  Our brains are designed to 
create the most coherent explanation out of the available information, and it is the consistency of 
the information that matters rather than its completeness (Kahneman, 2011).  This design feature 
can also lead to systematic biases (e.g., base rate neglect, overconfidence, confirmation bias), 
which is what makes searching for disconfirming information so difficult.  WYSIATI is relevant 
to explain how forensic evaluators form hypotheses, how they search for information to test their 
hypotheses, how they interpret the information they uncover, how they reach a decision, and how 
they communicate that information to the trier of fact. 
Let us return to the opening example about Mr. Jones.  There were at least 13 discrete 
pieces of information in the vignette.  How many pieces of information can you recall about him 
(try without looking before you look back)?  Although this question is somewhat relevant to 
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forensic clinician’s tasks, the more relevant question is how many pieces of information, and 
which ones, would you be thinking about when trying to integrate the data to reach a conclusion 
about the referral question (mental state at time of offense)?  
Faust and Faust (2012) describe this process of “configural analysis” (trying to integrate 
all the information gathered, analyzing the patterns of interrelationships among the various 
pieces of data), and they note that studies of human information processing suggest forensic 
clinicians are likely to be able to analyze the patterns of interrelationships only for about four 
discrete pieces of information at a time.  This is how WYSIATI works in real life.  Clinicians are 
limited by the “bounded rationality” of being a human being – we are all constrained by the 
limitations of our brain’s design.  Even if forensic clinicians do their due diligence and identify 
more than four pieces of critical information relevant to the referral question, when it comes to 
formulating their “bottom line,” forensic clinicians likely focus on the four(ish) pieces of 
information they interpret as most relevant to the question (whether they realize it or not).  
Anchoring 
The anchoring effect is a cognitive phenomenon in which we are overly influenced by 
initial information encountered (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  Anchoring, akin to priming and 
the halo effect, increases the weight of first impressions sometimes to the point that subsequent 
information is mostly wasted (Kahneman, 2011).  The sequence in which we encounter 
information is often determined by chance, but it matters.  Forensic evaluators who perform child 
custody evaluations, for example, may be well aware of what happens in speaking with one party 
at a time.  Imagine first meeting with the mother, who presents as a smart, articulate, attractive 
35-year old professional.  She comes across as non-defensive, fully capable of parenting safely 
and competently, and tells you that her child’s father is domineering, emotionally abusive to 
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herself and their daughter, and that he is dragging out the custody battle out of spite.  You are 
struck by how likeable and credible she is, and before you even meet with the father, you may 
have a pretty sound “hunch.”  Now imagine the counterfactual, in which you meet with the 
father, who presents as a smart, articulate, attractive 35-year old professional.  He comes across 
as non-defensive, fully capable of parenting safely and competently, and tells you that his child’s 
mother is domineering, emotionally abusive to himself and their daughter, and that she is 
dragging out the custody battle out of spite.  You are struck by how likeable and credible he is. 
Any forensic evaluator might hear a coherent and compelling story told by the first 
person interviewed and begin to formulate hypotheses about the case, only to hear a different 
(and perhaps contradictory) story later from another party that might be just as coherent and 
compelling.  Unfortunately, people often have difficulty sufficiently adjusting an original 
hypothesis based on information encountered later.  The evaluator must somehow make sense of 
the contradictory information and beware the anchoring effect of the information from the first 
party whom the evaluator happened to interview   
Framing and context effects are particularly relevant to forensic work.  Framing is a 
cognitive heuristic in which people tend to reach conclusions based on the framework within 
which the situation was presented (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  People may draw different 
conclusions on the basis of the same information, depending on how the information was framed 
or the context in which it was delivered.  There is a built-in system of framing inherent in 
adversarial legal systems.  The recent body of research on adversarial allegiance in forensic 
experts, which shows that mental health professionals may reach conclusions and opinions 
consistent with the goals of their retaining party (see e.g., Murrie, Boccaccini, Johnson, & Janke, 
2008; Murrie et al., 2009; Murrie et al., 2013), might be interpreted with regard to this bias.   
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Building on their previous body of work, Murrie and colleagues (2013) conducted an 
elegant scientific experiment which demonstrated this effect.  They “hired” forensic psychiatric 
and psychological experts to review a defendant’s case file and score the offender on two 
commonly used, well-researched risk assessment instruments.  The experts were led to believe 
they had either been hired by the defense or the prosecution.  That is, the manipulated 
independent variable was the adversarial “side” for which experts thought they were working 
(case and offender materials were held constant).  Experts who believed they were working for 
the defense tended to assign lower scores on the risk instruments than experts who believed they 
were working for the prosecution.  The effect sizes were up to d = .85 (large effects).   
Murrie and colleagues attributed the adversarial allegiance effect directly to experts’ 
beliefs about for whom they were working, because they controlled for other possible 
explanations.  The substantive information provided about the defendant was constant, so 
differences in the way the examinee presented could not have explained the findings.  
Furthermore, they eliminated the overt verbal influence often provided by the referral party in 
routine forensic practice that contributes to confirmation bias.  This design element is important: 
their findings show that even when there is no overt framing by a referral party, there is still an 
insidious yet potentially potent form of anchoring due to adversarial allegiance.  
Can We Reduce Bias in Forensic Practice? 
 We have reviewed how psychological science has come to better understand subtle but 
powerful sources of bias in human decision making.  We focused the review especially on 
cognitive processes that might threaten the accuracy of forensic clinicians’ thinking when they 
are formulating their hypotheses during or after acquiring evaluation data.  Throughout the 
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review, we provided examples to show how forensic examiners’ use of evaluation data could 
potentially fall prey to subtle sources bias and error that can affect their conclusions.      
 We now pose the question, “Should we be concerned?”  Let us accept the existence of 
such potential sources of bias in judgment and decision making.  Let us presume that forensic 
mental health examiners, like other humans, are susceptible to heuristic and other cognitive 
sources of bias in their processing of information.  Is there reason for forensic mental health 
assessment as a field, and forensic examiners individually, to take this on as a problem?  Or 
should we accept our inevitable human fallibility while taking the lessons simply as a warning 
that we must “exercise due caution?”   
 We think there are good reasons to be concerned.  Scientific and clinical expertise in the 
courtroom is dependent on the expectancy that the expert seeks accuracy and avoids anything 
that may lead to bias in the collection or interpretation of data.  Challenging that expectancy is a 
growing body of research suggesting that forensic examiners differ in the data they collect and 
the opinions they reach, depending on the social contexts in which they are involved in forensic 
cases (e.g., Brown, 1992; Deitchman, 1991; Homant & Kennedy, 1986, 1987a, 1987b; Murrie et 
al., 2013; Neal, 2011; Svec, 1991).  These studies are identifying the results of error, bias, and 
inaccuracy in our work.  And decision making science offers plausible ways to explain it.   
Failure to address the questions runs counter to our professional obligation to be 
accountable for our performance and to strive for the integrity of our opinions.  Moreover, failure 
to address the questions degrades our perceived credibility.   
Framing the Problem 
 As one considers the theories of bias in decision making, it is apparent that the ultimate 
objectives are (a) to explain ways in which human decisional processes fail to achieve accuracy 
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and (b) uncover means of correcting the errors to improve accuracy.  These objectives parallel 
the psychometric notion of validity.  We might ask how bias and error detract from achieving 
valid answers to forensic referral questions.  However, for most forensic questions, there is no 
obvious criterion variable representing the “truth,” no touchstone with which to evaluate the 
validity of our answers to the questions.   
An imperfect substitute for improving our validity is to improve our reliability, at least as 
an initial goal (see e.g., Mossman, 2013).  We might propose that two clinicians should arrive at 
similar clinical assessments. That sameness—the essence of reliability—can be our touchstone as 
we explore the influences of bias on forensic opinions.  This would not necessarily mean the two 
clinicians arrived at the right opinion.  Reliability does not guarantee validity; it merely assures a 
condition without which validity cannot be achieved.   
Given that we frame the problem of cognitive bias and error in forensic practice as a 
problem of reliability (at least for now), we consider three ways to respond to the problem.  One 
of these approaches seeks understanding and the second seeks change.  The third imagines a 
paradigm shift with potential to mitigate the problem.   
Discovering the Extent of the Problem 
 Recent studies of the opinions of forensic clinicians in cases involving multiple experts 
have identified what they interpret as substantial unreliability in those opinions (see e.g., 
Boccaccini, Turner, & Murrie, 2008; Boccaccini, Turner, Murrie, & Rufino, 2012; Gowensmith, 
Murrie, & Boccaccini, 2012, 2013; Murrie et al., 2008, 2009, 2013; Murrie, Boccaccini, Zapf, 
Warren, & Henderson, 2008; Murrie & Warren, 2005).  Moreover, the unreliability appears to be 
largely related to the examiners’ agency, allegiance, and sometimes personality and attitudes.  
Those studies tell us something about the conditions in which bias might arise, but they do not 
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enlighten us about how bias works.  They tell us nothing about heuristics and biases at the level 
of cognitive effort during the collection, sorting, and use of information in forensic cases.  It is 
reasonable to hypothesize that the types of errors in logic and heuristic thinking described by 
cognitive science “serve” the social and personal influences that appear to drive unreliable 
outcomes.  Can we develop a body of research that connects variance in forensic opinions with 
specific sources of bias or errors in logic during data collection or case formulation?  
 One type of research would identify whether and how various cognitive heuristics occur 
when forensic clinicians are processing data in their case formulation.  There is little reason to 
believe that forensic clinicians are any more or less immune to heuristics and biases than are any 
other similarly-intelligent decision makers in unstructured decision tasks.  Documenting this in 
the context of forensic case formulation, and identifying specific types of more common biases 
in processing cases, would provide a fundamental start for identifying the extent of the problem.
 A line of research could explore the “dynamics” of heuristics and biases in forensic 
clinicians’ cognitive processing of cases.  Under what social conditions are the various sources 
of cognitive bias and error increased or decreased?  This research might show that conditions of 
agency, allegiance, or other incentives augment the play of cognitive heuristics and biases when 
formulating cases, offering a cognitive explanation for unreliability in forensic formulations.  To 
what degree do decision aids and structured methods decrease bias and improve accuracy?   
 One of the challenges of this work will be delineating the elements of the “forensic 
evaluation process” where biases and errors may exert an effect.  There may be many ways to 
construe the process, but here we offer a simple one to provide an example.  The forensic 
evaluation process begins with a referral question that guides the evaluation.  The evaluation 
then includes:  (a) selection of types of data to collect; (b) collection of the data; (c) analysis of 
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the data; and (d) interpretation of the data to formulate a forensic opinion.  These domains within 
the evaluation process might allow us to discover how bias works in various ways associated 
with the steps in the process.  Considered respectively, they offer the potential to determine how 
biases (a) narrow or expand our search for relevant data, (b) influence the quality and integrity of 
the data that we collect, (c) influence how we score or subjectively classify the data we have 
obtained, and (d) influence how we combine the data when testing our hypotheses and their 
alternatives regarding the answer to the forensic question.  
Finding Remedies that Overcome Bias 
 A second way to respond to the problem is to seek ways to reduce clinicians’ 
susceptibility to biases that increase unreliability.  One might suppose that the line of research 
described in the first approach – discovering the extent of the problem – would be a required 
prelude to the identification of remedial strategies.  Yet we should consider the possibility that 
the two lines of research could proceed in parallel fashion.  Indeed, the former studies might 
sometimes include design features that explore remedial potentials.  
What do we already know about debiasing strategies? The decision-making field has 
described various ways to make people aware of the positive and negative effects of heuristics on 
their decision making (see e.g., Gawande, 2009; Kahneman, 2011). Indeed, the potential sources 
of bias described earlier in this paper are known to many in business, medicine, education, and 
science.  Yet arming people with insight into sources of heuristic error does not guarantee that 
the insights will be used.  That should not be surprising.  Almost all adaptive functioning 
requires not merely knowledge, but also motivation and practice.  At minimum, putting such 
information to use would seem to require a desire to avoid bias and error and alertness to 
conditions in which such bias and error can occur (Kahneman, 2011).  Efforts to change 
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individuals’ cognitive heuristics could also be fashioned as educational procedures that allow 
individuals to recognize, practice, and repetitively rehearse positive heuristic methods while 
processing information that is relevant for them—in this case, formulating forensic cases.     
 One specific debiasing strategy that has a good chance of being useful for forensic 
clinicians is locating and then keeping in mind relevant base rates (Kahneman, 2011).  For 
example, Schwartz, Strack, Hilton, and Naderer (1991) found that instructing people to “think 
like a statistician” enhanced the use of base-rate information, whereas instructing people to 
“think like a clinician” had the opposite effect.  Kahneman (2011) suggests that the corrective 
procedure is to develop a baseline prediction, which you would make if you knew nothing 
specific about the case (e.g., find the relevant base rate).  Second, determine whether the base 
rate matches your clinical judgment about the case.  When thinking about your clinical judgment, 
always question the strength of the evidence you’ve gathered (How sound is the evidence? How 
independent are the observations? Don’t confuse correlation with causation, etc.).  Then aim for 
a conclusion somewhere between the baseline prediction and your clinical judgment (and stay 
much closer to baseline if the evidence underlying the clinical judgment is poor). Clinicians 
often tend to exaggerate the persuasiveness of case-specific information (Faust & Faust, 2012; 
Kahneman, 2011).  Therefore, anchoring with a base rate and then critically evaluating the 
strength of the case-specific diagnostic information are offered as recommendations to combat 
the representativeness heuristic and overconfidence (Kahneman, 2011).  
Another debiasing strategy is to “consider the opposite” (Koehler, 1991; Lord, Lepper, & 
Preston, 1985).  This strategy may be particularly useful for forensic clinicians, given the 
adversarial nature of courtroom proceedings.  Expert witnesses testify through direct- and cross-
examination.  Imagining how one’s assessment methods, data, and interpretations will be 
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scrutinized during cross-examination is often recommended as a trial preparation strategy (e.g., 
Brodsky, 2012). Part of that consideration is recognizing that the opposing side will not merely 
attack the proof for the clinician’s opinion, but might also pose alternative interpretations and 
contradictory data, asking the clinician why they were rejected.   Similarly, Lord and colleagues 
(1985) found that people could mitigate confirmation bias when asked a question like, “Consider 
how you’d evaluate the case given opposite results,” while a global motivational instruction to 
“try to be unbiased” was not an effective bias mitigation strategy. 
Structure and systematic methods. The notion that observers’ interpretation of evidence 
might be influenced by personal interests and prejudices dates back at least to Sir Francis Bacon, 
who is credited with advocating the scientific method in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
(MacCoun, 1998). Structure and systematic methods are the backbones of the scientific method.  
What do we already know about how structure, standardized procedure, and evidence-based 
decision making improve the reliability and validity of forensic evaluations?  The closely-related 
body of research on the poor reliability of clinical judgment sheds light on this question (see e.g., 
Faust & Faust, 2012 for an overview).   
Many studies have shown that structured methods improve forensic assessments as 
compared to unstructured clinical judgments.  For example, in a meta-analysis of recidivism risk 
assessments for sexual offenders, Hanson and Morton-Bourgon (2009) showed that actuarial 
measures (such as the Static-99) were considerably more accurate than unstructured clinical 
judgment for all outcomes (sexual, violent, or any recidivism).  In a meta-analysis of violence 
risk assessments, Guy (2008) found that if evaluations employed structured professional 
judgment tools (such as the HCR-20; Webster, Douglas, Eaves, & Hart, 1997) and actuarial tools 
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(such as the VRAG; Harris, Rice, & Quinsey, 1993), they performed better in predicting 
antisocial behavior than assessments that relied on an unstructured clinical judgment approach.   
These methods might improve forensic evaluations by helping forensic clinicians 
minimize the effects of their biases on their work.  Research findings have shown that allegiance 
effects (i.e., assessments scored in the direction that would be preferred by the adversarial 
retaining party) are stronger for more subjective measures but attenuated with more structured 
measures.  Murrie and colleagues (2009) found that allegiance effects were stronger for the 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003), a measure that requires more subjective 
judgments in scoring, than for the Static-99, which requires less clinical judgment.  Interrater 
agreement between evaluators working for opposing parties were stronger for the Static-99 (ICC 
= .064) but weaker for the PCL-R (ICC = 0.42). These findings were replicated in the 2013 paper 
by Murrie and colleagues. Specifically, effect sizes for the allegiance effect with the PCL-R were 
up to d = 0.85 (large effect), whereas the effect sizes for the Static-99R (Helmus, Thornton, 
Hanson, & Babchishin, 2012) were up to d = 0.42 (small-to-medium effect).  Thus, more 
structured measures appear to be associated with higher inter-rater agreement rates and lower 
adversarial allegiance bias.  Perhaps more structured measures also attenuate the other kinds of 
biases outlined in this review.  Further research might inform potential bias-mitigation remedies. 
Another strategy to increase reliability and validity, and likely decrease bias, would be to 
identify approximately four to six variables essential to the referral issue at question.  The 
dimensions should be as independent as possible from each other, and they should be amenable 
to reliable assessment (they should be highly valid, highly reliable indicators).  Identifying these 
essential dimensions for consideration with each kind of referral question might decrease the 
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time, money, and other resources spent on cases, and might also increase the other quality 
indicators described above (e.g., Faust & Faust, 2012; Gawande, 2009; Kahneman, 2011).   
Take, for example, an evaluator tasked with assessing a defendant’s competency to stand 
trial (CST) abilities.  The few essential variables might include active symptoms of mental 
illness (which could be assessed with existing valid and reliable measures), intellectual or 
cognitive capacity (could also be assessed reliable with valid measures), ability to remain in 
behavioral control or inhibit impulsive behaviors (could be indexed through a review of the 
defendant’s recent history and history during similar episodes, if there have been previous 
episodes), and perhaps degree of malingering (could be assessed with an existing response style 
indicator, particularly one developed to measure CST-related malingering).  Although variables 
like educational attainment, age, and history of mental illness might be related to the referral 
question, these variables are unlikely to be as useful for generating a sound conclusion.  
Educational attainment could be a proxy for cognitive capacity, but measuring the capacity is a 
more valid and reliable way to index this particular trait (and education and cognitive abilities 
should not both be considered essential variables, because they are not as independent of one 
another as would be ideal).  History of mental illness might be relevant, but would be less 
relevant than current symptoms of illness.  However, particular behaviors during previous 
episodes might be essential (e.g., demonstrated difficulty inhibiting impulsive verbal and 
physical outbursts in previous court appearances during periods of active psychosis). 
Finally, research might seek to develop an anti-bias linear or branching procedure that 
clinicians could follow in their practice, or perhaps “checklists” of essential elements for 
clinicians to systematically consider for various situations.  A measure for violence risk 
assessment called the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR; Monahan, Steadman, Appelbaum 
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et al., 2005) is one example.  It relies on classification-tree analysis to allow several different 
variables to be considered together.  It produces an actuarial estimate of risk, but is intended to 
be used by clinicians as one piece of information upon which to base conclusions and decisions.  
This kind of tool and other “checklist” methods, like structured professional judgment tools, 
might guide forensic clinicians around the biases that arise in various steps of the evaluation 
process while encouraging positive heuristics.  
Imagining a Systemic Adjustment 
  The two approaches we have described focus on understanding how forensic examiners 
think and then potentially modifying their thinking.  These approaches consider the problem a 
matter of faulty human performance that requires changing the individual.  Yet psychology has 
long recognized that problems in human functioning sometimes admit to a different type of 
analysis that refocuses the problem as one of person-environment fit.  If one can change the 
individual to fit the environment’s demands, sometimes that is preferable.  But if that proves too 
difficult, one can at least consider whether one can change the environment—the context in 
which the individual must function—to reduce the problem.   
It is proper, therefore, for our analysis to conclude by imagining the development of a 
legal context that would mitigate the problem of bias in forensic practice.  This leads us to 
consider a context that we do not advocate.  We offer it in the form of a “thought experiment,” 
potentially for its “heuristic” value as our field searches for creative solutions to the problem of 
forensic examiner bias.4     
 Forensic experts are expected to use their science to lead them to an objective opinion.  
When two experts in the same field arrive at different opinions, judges and juries tend to assume 
                                                          
4 See MacCoun, 1998 for a similar analysis of inquisitorial versus adversarial models of science in his Annual 
Review of Psychology Article called “Biases in the interpretation and use of research results.”  
BIAS IN FORENSIC EVALUATIONS  31 
 
either of two things.  The experts’ science is unreliable, or the experts used their science in a 
biased manner.  But let us imagine a legal system that does not expect forensic clinicians to 
arrive at similar opinions.  It expects the forensic experts to endeavor to build an argument for a 
conclusion that favors the party that called them, developing the best version possible that the 
available data will allow.  In the paradigm we are imagining, the expert is relieved of the task of 
finding the explanation that most objectively fits the data.  It allows the expert to create a 
“favored” interpretation that is consistent with, and not contradicted by, the data.  In some cases 
the expert will find that it simply cannot be done.  If so, the party is free not to call the expert to 
report or testify, and law could shield the expert’s investigation from discovery.  In many cases, 
the expert will be able to build an interpretation of the available data and a conclusion—
sometimes more plausible, sometimes less—that fits the interests of the party.    
One defense of this paradigm rests with the law’s adversarial process of arriving at just 
decisions when the “truth” is often obscure.  To resolve disputes, our legal system developed 
over time a structured and transparent process (called “due process” in the U.S.) through which it 
considers multiple perspectives in an adversarial framework.  The system’s adversarial 
framework attempts to achieve fairness through procedural justice (Rawls, 1971).  Recognizing 
that truth may be unknowable in human affairs, it is procedure that matters most, so that if 
trustworthy processes are followed, truth can be closely approximated even if it is not attained. 
In this adversarial framework, the trial process relies on two parties to make arguments in favor 
of their opposing opinions.  Both parties must investigate the potential evidence and construct 
their interpretation of the evidence that best fits their position in the case.  This system presumes 
that many fact circumstances can be interpreted in different ways, and it makes no presumptions 
about the differential validity of the interpretations.     
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The analysis thus far has focused only on the interpretation of the data to reach a 
conclusion.  What about the data themselves?  Is there not a danger that the expert will 
selectively seek, or selectively find, only those data that will support the party’s argument?  
Again we find a possible parallel with the role of attorneys in the criminal justice process.  They 
are ethically bound to engage in competent practice that offers zealous advocacy for their party.  
Arguably, that ethical obligation is breached when an attorney seeks only evidence that will 
support their party’s argument.  In doing so, the attorney might well miss data that could support 
the other party’s argument.  Having missed it, the attorney is unprepared to defend against it, and 
thus does damage to the party to which allegiance is owed, therefore practicing incompetently.   
In this revised forensic-clinical paradigm, the situation of the forensic expert working 
with either party would be much the same.  The expert is expected to participate in the 
adversarial process (rather than being removed from it) by seeking the best interpretation for the 
party’s conclusion that can be supported by the data.  But seeking only those data that support 
the conclusion will weaken the plausibility of the interpretation.  It will not stand up to other data 
that the opposing party might have found and against which the expert will be unprepared to 
defend.  Thus the expert will be ethically obligated to find all data, not just data that support the 
adversarial hypothesis.  Moreover, those data must be competently and reliably obtained, scored, 
and interpreted in light of past research.  Just as attorneys using inaccurate information may harm 
their clients’ interests, so experts’ unreliable data may do the same.    
This approach is often used to stimulate academic debate, with two experts constructing 
the two best opposing theoretical interpretations they can create using existing observations.  (In 
fact, the argument we are currently constructing is based on such a model).  The matter is 
somewhat different, though, for clinical professionals.  Typically they are obligated to arrive at 
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opinions in a neutral and objective manner, so that their opinions will avoid error that may harm 
their patients.  In the alternative paradigm we outline here, society might assign experts a role 
that does not require neutrality, but rather asks them to exercise their special expertise to produce 
the two best-supported but perhaps contradictory views of a case.   
Forensic examiners’ primary obligation would be (a) accuracy in one’s use of objective 
methods of data collection, (b) integrity in the description of one’s data, and (c) clarity and 
honesty in describing the manner in which the data led to one’s conclusion.  Put another way, 
one’s data must be reliable, and one’s processing of the information (typically called one’s 
interpretation of the data) must be explained.  Given this paradigm, reliability between two 
examiners should be required for (a), but would be variable for (b) and (c).   
  We offer this paradigm shift for further consideration.  Undoubtedly a more penetrating 
analysis will find the potential for consequential damage in this model. There may also be flaws 
in the analogy, which may or may not be remediable.  For example, attorneys are obligated to 
seek all information that may support and refute their party’s position, but are they required to 
reveal it?  In criminal cases, if prosecutors know of data that would harm the state’s position and 
favor the defendant, they must reveal it.  Defense attorneys have no such obligation.  Our legal 
system’s protection of individual liberty requires the state to prove guilt and provides defendants 
the right to withhold information that might incriminate them.  Were this to apply to experts, the 
expert for the prosecution would operate much as is expected now, revealing all sources and 
types of information that were obtained in the evaluation.  But defense experts would reveal only 
the data that they collected that favored the defense, while withholding all negative data.    
The problems with this are quite evident.  For example, if a defense expert administered 
an instrument measuring psychopathic traits, would the score be reported only if it were below 
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the psychopathy cut-off?  Would we report only psychopathology test scores for scales on which 
the client scored in a direction favoring the defense argument, while leaving out scores on the 
other scales?  Furthermore, how might adopting an advocacy role affect the examiner’s ability to 
collect, score, and interpret “objective” tests?  Explicit adoption of an adversarial role might lead 
to even greater differences in test data obtained by defense and prosecution experts than have 
been uncovered by researchers to date (e.g., Murrie et al., 2013).  One potential remedy would be 
a requirement that the same database be used by explicitly adversarial experts.  For example, a 
court-appointed psychometrician might administer and score the relevant test instruments 
requested by the adversarial parties, then the adversarial experts might be expected to interpret 
and make use of those data alongside the other data in forming their adversarial conclusions and 
opinions.  Such an approach might maximize objectivity (in data collection) but also make best 
use of the adversarial nature of the fact-finding legal justice system.   
Conclusion 
 Recent studies have examined the relation of personal and situational variables, including 
those that can be explained by judgment and decision making science, to forensic examiners’ 
opinions.  These studies have provided sufficient evidence of the need to address the issue of 
bias in forensic mental health evaluations.  Not all agree that the current studies actually indicate 
bias (Mossman, 2013).  But there is mounting evidence contrary to the notion of random error.  
We anticipate that increasingly we will be held accountable in the courts to explain recent 
research evidence that challenges our objectivity and credibility.  
Accordingly, we have offered a review of various sources of bias in decision making that 
might provide frameworks and concepts for future studies.  If these studies provide better 
understanding of the phenomenon, we envision the creative development of ways that clinicians 
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can reduce the effects of bias when they are processing data and arriving at opinions.  Finally, we 
imagined a legal context that might change the role of forensic examiners in a way that accepts 
adversarial participation through expert evidence – a legal context full of practical, scientific, and 
ethical questions.  These questions may or may not be worth trying to answer as we strive to 
improve the validity and reliability of forensic mental health evaluations and to foster trust in our 
work process and products. 
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Table 1. List and definition of various cognitive biases in forensic assessment. 
 
Bias Related biases Definition 
   
Representativeness   Overemphasizing evidence that resembles a 
typical representation of a prototype. 
 Conjunction Fallacy  A compound event is judged more likely 
than is one of its elements alone. 
 Base Rate Neglect Judging an outcome’s likelihood without 
considering information about the actual 
probability that it will occur. 
Availability  Overestimating the probability of an occurrence 
when other instances are relatively easy to recall. 
 Confirmation bias  Selectively gathering and interpreting 
evidence that confirms a hypothesis and 
ignoring evidence that might disconfirm it. 
 WYSIATI  
(What You See Is All There Is) 
Activated information is organized to 
derive the most coherent “story” possible 
(non-activated information is left out). 
Anchoring  Information encountered first is more influential 
than information encountered later. 
 Framing/Context Drawing different conclusions from the 
same information, depending on how or by 
whom that information is presented. 
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Erratum, “Correction to Neal and Grisso (2014)” published in volume 20, page 345.  doi: 
10.1037/law00000022 
Abstract: 
Reports an error in "The cognitive underpinnings of bias in forensic mental health evaluations" by Tess M. S. Neal 
and Thomas Grisso (Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 2014[May], Vol 20[2], 200-211). This article contained an 
error that ironically demonstrates the very point of the article: that cognitive biases can easily lead to error—even by 
people who are highly attuned to and motivated to avoid bias. The authors inadvertently misapplied base rates by 
failing to account for nested probabilities in the illustration of how Bayesian analysis works in footnote 2 (p. 203). 
Specific details are provided.  
 
 
Text of erratum: 
The article, “The Cognitive Underpinnings of Bias in Forensic Mental Health Evaluations” by Tess M. S. Neal and 
Thomas Grisso (Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 2014, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 200 –211. doi:10.1037/a0035824) 
contained an error that ironically demonstrates the very point of the article: that cognitive biases can easily lead to 
error— even by people who are highly attuned to and motivated to avoid bias. The authors inadvertently misapplied 
base rates by failing to account for nested probabilities in the illustration of how Bayesian analysis works in footnote 
2 (p. 203). Specifically, the authors said that a person’s belief about the probability of a given attorney being a 
woman should be 33.3%, given the base rate of women in the legal profession (ABA, 2013). They then tried to 
demonstrate how Bayes’ Theorem works by incorporating new information about the attorney being a managing 
partner at one of the 200 largest law firms in the U.S., which has a base rate of 4% women (ABA, 2013). The 
authors combined these two probabilities (33.3% with 4%) using Bayes’ Theorem to demonstrate how the person’s 
belief about the probability of the attorney being a woman should have changed, given the new evidence. In doing 
this, they engaged in a cognitive error similar to the conjunction fallacy described on pages 202–203. They should 
not have applied Bayes’ Theorem to combine the two probabilities. The new evidence – that the attorney was a 
managing partner at one of the 200 law firms in the U.S. (with its corresponding base rate of 4% women) – should 
have replaced, rather than supplemented, the original 33.3% overall base rate information, and thus the “answer” 
should have been 4% rather than 2.04%. The base rate of women who are large law firm managers is nested within 
the larger base rate for all women lawyers. Therefore, once the 4% base rate for women as large law firm managers 
was known, the original base rates for women lawyers generally was no longer relevant. Bayes’ Theorem presumes 
the conditional independence of the two probabilities in question. In this case, however, the probabilities were not 
independent. The probability that X is a woman manager of a large law firm logically assumes that X is a woman 
lawyer.  
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